Search Results for: Line 5

Line 5 Poses On-land Explosion Risk for Michigan Residents

On August 1, a natural gas pipeline operated by an Enbridge subsidiary exploded in Kentucky. The blast killed one person, injured six others, and blew 30 feet of pipeline out of the ground, resulting in a crater that is 50 feet long, 35 feet wide and 13 feet deep. About 66 million cubic feet of natural gas was released by the explosion, with the resulting fire destroying multiple structures and burning vegetation over approximately 30 acres of land.

Although public attention has rightly focused on the risk of a catastrophic oil spill from Enbridge’s Line 5 pipelines at the Straits of Mackinac, FLOW board member Rick Kane points out that the risk of a similar explosion is also possible because of the natural gas liquids (NGLs) running the length of Line 5’s 645-mile transit through Wisconsin and Michigan. Here is Kane’s analysis.

 

Enbridge’s Line 5, a legacy hazardous liquids pipeline, poses a major explosion and fire safety risk to citizens and property along its entire length while it transports natural gas liquids (NGLs). This risk is particularly high for the Line 5 segments north and south of the Straits of Mackinac. Why is this issue not being investigated as part of the proposed tunnel project so that citizens and first responders living along the Line 5 hazard zone know the current risk and likelihood that permitting and replacing the pipeline will pose in the future?

The severe consequences of a Line 5 failure and crude oil release into the Straits have been widely publicized. Construction of a tunnel with a new pipeline is now being pursued as a risk reduction approach against a major crude oil spill disaster. However, a tunnel does not reduce the risks posed by Line 5 across the Upper Peninsula and Lower Peninsula where a rupture could release crude oil into hundreds of lakes, rivers and streams, some even leading to the Great Lakes. Nearly absent from the studies and debate are the threats and catastrophic consequences to human safety and property posed by Line 5 while it transports NGLs.

FLOW highlighted the NGL risks in 2018. The risk was on display on August 1 when a large legacy natural gas pipeline in Kentucky exploded, causing one death and sending five residents to the hospital. Unfortunately, the Kentucky incident is only one of many in recent history.

Pipelines are the safest transportation mode for crude oil, NGLs and especially natural gas. However, there are a wide range of pipeline design specifications, materials transported, pipeline ages, physical conditions and operating environments. Line 5 is a legacy pipeline, well past its designed retirement age, operating in an extremely sensitive environment and transiting through several populated areas. Unlike wine, a vintage pipeline does not get better with age; government and industry statistics show that failure rates increase dramatically for legacy-class pipelines. Several major incidents in recent years call into question the reliability of pipeline industry failure prevention programs to justify the continued operation of these pipelines.

A Line 5 failure during the transport of NGLs could have consequences beyond the Kentucky failure and other too-typical natural gas pipeline failures:

  • Natural gas (methane) is transported as a compressed gas. The NGLs in Line 5 are mostly propane with some ethane and butane that are gases compressed to a liquid state when transported by pipeline.
  • When a natural gas pipeline failure occurs, a rapidly, vertically expanding gas cloud ignites, creating a huge flaming torch. Many people reported that the fire from the Kentucky explosion reached 300 feet high.
  • When an NGLs pipeline fails, liquid is expelled quickly, forming a large vapor cloud that moves with the wind until it finds an ignition source. Then the vapor cloud ignites, and an explosion and fireball occur with a shock wave, flame front and radiative heat wave moving out from the explosion area.
  • The potential energy (explosion and heat) from an NGLs explosion can be much greater than from a natural gas break as NGLs have a higher caloric value and the quantity of energy released can be much higher.
  • The risk study developed by Dynamic Risk Systems, Inc. for the State of Michigan in 2017 contained an NGLs deep water release scenario in the Straits that would result in a flame front of almost one mile. Contrast this with a ground level release upstream or downstream of the Straits where the release quantity could be much higher as the distance between pumping stations and shutoff valves is greater at ground level and near populated areas and valuable property. Computer modeling of potential release scenarios near populated areas would provide estimates of fatalities, property damage and important evacuation zones for law enforcement and first responders.

The Kentucky pipeline explosion is still being investigated but preliminary information indicates that the pipeline is similar in size, age and construction to Line 5. Corrosion is believed to be the cause of the failure, and as in other similar incidents, Enbridge is trumpeting the touted pipeline loss prevention program and the reliability of inspections with “smart pigs” to justify continued operation of legacy pipelines.

 

Issues and Questions   

  • The entirety of Line 5 will need to be replaced at some point if the tunnel project proceeds. Does the State of Michigan understand the risks for transporting NGLs in legacy hazardous liquid pipelines, and have assessments been conducted and verified by third-party experts? Are citizens living in the potential impact zone aware of the risk they face?
  • Do property owners and citizens know that a flurry of permit requests for Line 5 “maintenance replacement” will be issued if the tunnel project is given the green light, as was done with Line 6B/78 after the Kalamazoo River disaster in 2010? A similar piecemeal, preventative maintenance and capacity expansion approach is currently being used on Line 3 in Minnesota—a pipeline with an increasing number of failures that Enbridge says needs to be replaced and is 10 years younger than Line 5.
  • Importantly, emergency response organizations along the Line 5 route should complete pre-modeling of NGLs release scenarios to understand potential explosion overpressure and flame envelops and have evacuation scenarios ready to use. The modeling required is more complex than typically done by first responders for hazardous materials spills; they could underestimate the size of an evacuation zone.
  • The State of Michigan regulates gas pipelines but not hazardous liquid pipelines such as Line 5. Why not? Cost is not the answer: other states have taken on the task after disasters occurred; the cost is covered by inspection and audit fees charged to the pipeline companies. State inspections can supplement and provide local control rather than depending on the overwhelmed federal regulators from Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA).
  • What about a “National Emphasis Program” focused on pipeline safety starting with the largest operator, Enbridge? After a spate of major refinery and chemical facility accidents several years ago, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) implemented a National Emphasis Program (NEP) that focused on certain segments of the industry based on risk and accident history. Comprehensive inspections and audits addressed not only regulatory requirements but a company’s adherence to industry standards and requirements applicable through the General Duty Clause.

Accidents will continue as long as the pipeline industry uses its own standards for acceptable levels of pipeline failures and relies on current loss prevention and inspection programs for legacy pipelines. The industry is currently deciding the risk tolerance for citizens. A large NGLs pipeline rupture near a local city or village could happen again, just as Line 6B/78 dumped crude oil into the Kalamazoo River nine years ago.

Rick Kane, FLOW Board Member

Rick is the former Director of Security, Environment, Transportation Safety and Emergency Services for Rhodia, North America.  He is certified in environmental, hazardous materials, and security management, and is a graduate of the University of Michigan and University of Dallas.

Line 5’s Failing Design – Anchor Supports, Anchor Strikes, and the Rising Risk of an Oil Spill Disaster in the Great Lakes

Above: An underwater image from Canadian oil transport giant Enbridge shows deep grooves in the Straits of Mackinac lake bottom, going up and over one of the twin Line 5 oil pipelines and leaving damage to the pipe’s outer coating, the result of an April 1, 2018, anchor strike.
(Photo: Enbridge via U.S. Senate)


By Jim Olson

The disclosure by Enbridge that 81 feet of Line 5 has been undermined by powerful currents and is slumping points to something far more serious—and dangerous: The 66-year-old dual pipelines in the Straits of Mackinac are failing and also at risk of rupture from a ship’s anchor drag that hooks and rips the pipeline wide open. It is also a violation of the law that governs the protection of the public trust in the Great Lakes and the soils beneath them.

Since at least 2001, Enbridge has known of these risky violations of the easement that the State of Michigan granted in 1953 to conditionally authorized Enbridge to pump oil through twin pipelines, and changed the pipeline’s design by adding anchor supports to shore it up.

At first, it was a few anchors, but between then and now, Enbridge has added a total of 202 supports that elevate 3 miles of dual oil pipelines that were designed to lay on the lakebed of the Straits. The former Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) under the Snyder Administration was an accomplice allowing the supports, but without requiring authorization under Michigan law based on a necessary risk, impact, and alternative assessment.

Rather, the MDEQ until now has looked only at the impact to the lakebed from the screw anchors, nothing more. In other words, a completely new design is being built in the Straits for this dangerous Line 5 that carries nearly 23 million gallons of crude oil daily, and the design has never been evaluated or authorized by the DEQ, now the Department of Environment, Great Lakes, and Energy (EGLE). 

The State of Michigan now finally recognizes the greater risk of an anchor strike from the change in design; one dented the dual lines in three places in April 2018, and the State cited this serious risk in its lawsuit filed June 27 against Enbridge to shut down Line 5.

With 3 miles (almost 40 percent) of the Line 5 crude oil lines in the Straits now 2 to 4 feet above the lakebed, the next strike has a strong likelihood of hooking and rupturing the lines; causing a massive release that will devastate hundreds of miles of Lake Huron and Lake Michigan; shut down Mackinac Island, ferries, ships, drinking water, fishing, boating, and recreation; and destroy the habitat and ecosystem and economy for years to come—to wit: the Deep Horizons blowout in the Gulf of Mexico.

Fortunately, we have new leadership in Governor Gretchen Whitmer (call her office at 517-373-3400, or share your opinion here) and EGLE Director Liesl Clark (call her at 800-292-4706), who can correct this attack on the public trust rights of citizens in the Great Lakes, and restore the rule of law that was abandoned by the Snyder administration for 8 years.  What should you do?  Email or call Governor Whitmer and Director Clark , and urge them to take action immediately by sending a letter to Enbridge demanding it apply for authorization of this major change in design not covered by the 1953 easement, and never evaluated or allowed.

Jim Olson is FLOW’s Founder, President, and Legal Advisor.

No ‘Line 5’ Oil Tunnel in the Great Lakes!

Photo: FLOW Deputy Director Kelly Thayer speaks to the Grand Traverse County Board in opposition to a pro-oil tunnel resolution.


By Kelly Thayer

Confronted at 8 a.m. on a Wednesday by a full audience passionately and unanimously against a proposed Line 5 oil tunnel in the Straits of Mackinac, the Grand Traverse County Board of Commissioners voted today to temporarily table a misguided and error-filled resolution supporting the oil tunnel. (Click here to view a video of the meeting, once posted by the county).

Some commissioners also could be heard chatting among themselves before the meeting about the voluminous amount of emailed comments against the oil tunnel that they also received in the hours leading up to the session, as local citizen groups spread the word of the pending vote.

While the outcome was received as a temporary victory in the moment by many in attendance, vigilance still is required. The resolution, which had been expected to gain quick approval, will likely come back for reconsideration — perhaps at a tentatively scheduled 8 a.m., August 14, study session — and then a possible vote at the Grand Traverse County Board’s next regular meeting at 8 a.m. on Wednesday, August 21, at the Governmental Center at 400 Boardman Ave. in Traverse City.

“I was elected to work for the public interest and the people of Grand Traverse County, not the bottom line of a foreign oil company with a troubling safety record and equally troubling transparency practices,” said Commissioner Betsy Coffia after the meeting, who was prepared to oppose the symbolic resolution. “Enbridge pays a lot of lobbyists and lawyers to carry water for them. I don’t think it’s the job of the Grand Traverse County Commission to do that work for them.”

Only one county in Michigan—Dickinson in the Upper Peninsula—to date has approved the model resolution that bears close resemblance to talking points that Line 5-owner Enbridge has circulated for many months. The resolution tabled by Grand Traverse County Commissioners proposes to send “this resolution to all counties of Michigan as an invitation to join in expressing support” for the oil tunnel owned by Canadian-based Enbridge.

Dozens of people representing themselves, families, Indian tribes, businesses, environmental groups, and others attended and many spoke up against the oil tunnel and for protection of the Great Lakes, drinking water, public trust and tribal rights, and the Pure Michigan tourist economy.

FLOW and its team of lawyers, scientists, engineers, and an international risk expert since 2013 have studied the increasing threat from Line 5 in the Straits of Mackinac and, more recently, the proposed Line 5 oil tunnel.

FLOW Deputy Director Kelly Thayer read a statement calling on the county board to reject the oil tunnel resolution, which in its first sentence, incorrectly states the age of the decaying pipeline and claims an admirable safety record that is at odds with the reality that Line 5 has leaked at least 33 times, spilling a total of 1.1 million gallons of oil in Michigan and Wisconsin.

“It is critical for the Grand Traverse Board of County Commissioners to understand that—with the proposed resolution in your packet—the Board is being asked to interfere in ongoing litigation between the State of Michigan and Enbridge,” Thayer said. “In addition, there are at least four other active lawsuits against Enbridge and Line 5. Therefore, this type of resolution is misguided and not in Grand Traverse County’s, nor the public, interest.”

In March, Michigan Attorney General Dana Nessel found that the tunnel bill that became law was unconstitutional. In early June, Enbridge sued the State of Michigan to resuscitate the tunnel legislation. And in late June, the State of Michigan sued Enbridge to revoke the 1953 easement that conditionally authorized Enbridge to pump oil through the twin pipelines.

Attorney General Nessel’s lawsuit alleges that Enbridge’s continued operation of Line 5 in the Straits violates the Public Trust Doctrine, is a common law public nuisance, and violates the Michigan Environmental Protection Act based on potential pollution, impairment, and destruction of water and other natural resources.

“Why would the current Grand Traverse County Board, which—to our knowledge—has never studied nor discussed the threat from Line 5, take a leap of faith in supporting a Canadian oil pipeline company’s alternative that diverts attention from the real problem—the bent, cracked, and encrusted oil pipelines in the Straits?,” Thayer asked.

Enbridge wants the right to bore a tunnel in the next 5-10 years for Line 5 through State of Michigan public trust bottomlands under the Straits, where Lake Michigan meets Lake Huron.

Enbridge also wants to keep pumping up to 23 million gallons of oil and natural gas liquids a day through the decaying, 66-year-old Line 5 pipelines in the Straits during tunnel feasibility studies and construction. An oil tunnel also would fail to address the risk posed by Line 5’s more than 400 stream and river crossings in the Upper and Lower Peninsulas and would conflict with Michigan Gov. Gretchen Whitmer’s plans to combat climate change.

The City of Mackinac Island, Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians, and the Straits of Mackinac Alliance citizen group also have filed a contested case challenging Enbridge’s claim that installing hundreds of anchor supports to shore up the decaying Line 5 is mere maintenance, rather than a major redesign requiring an application and alternatives analysis under the 1955 Great Lakes Submerged Lands Act (GLSLA) and public trust law that apply to the soils and waters of the Great Lakes. Line 5-related lawsuits against the U.S. Coast Guard and against Enbridge in Wisconsin also continue.

FLOW and other Great Lakes advocates have long called for shutting down Line 5, which primarily serves Canada’s, not Michigan’s, needs and threatens the Great Lakes. FLOW research shows that viable alternatives exist to deliver propane to Michigan and oil to regional refineries, and Gov. Whitmer has formed an Upper Peninsula Energy Task Force to identify energy supply options. The system can adjust with smart planning.

You can learn more by visiting FLOW’s Line 5 program page and by downloading a copy of FLOW’s latest:

And you can contact the Grand Traverse County Board of Commissioners here:

  • Rob Hentschel, chair, rhentschel@grandtraverse.org or 231-946-4277
  • Ron Clous, vice chair, rclous@grandtraverse.org or 231-590-3316
  • Brad Jewett (introduced the pro-tunnel resolution) bjewett@grandtraverse.org or 231-633-9421
  • Betsy Coffia, bcoffia@grandtraverse.org or 231-714-9598
  • Bryce Hundley, bhundley@grandtraverse.org or 231-753-8602
  • Gordie LaPointe, glapointe@grandtraverse.org or 231-409-2607
  • Sonny Wheelock, swheelock@grandtraverse.org or 231-947-3277